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A PUNCHER’S CHANCE: ASSESSING THE CLASSIFICATION
OF MARTIAL ARTISTS’ HANDS AS DEADLY WEAPONS
“The ultimate aim of martial arts is not having to use them.” 1
I.

INTRODUCTION: THROWING THE PUNCH HEARD
‘ROUND THE WORLD

In November of 2013, twenty-seven-year-old Jamal Parks made
waves in the legal realm of martial arts when he was charged with
aggravated assault under the Texas Penal Code.2 According to reports, Mr. Parks was involved in an altercation in his home with his
friend.3 As the situation escalated, Mr. Parks reportedly beat his
friend with his hands and threw him through drywall.4 Further,
when the police arrived, Mr. Parks physically assaulted the responding officer severely enough to jeopardize the officer’s life.5 According to the section of the Texas Penal Code under which Mr. Parks
was charged, a finding that a deadly weapon was employed in the
assault is required to establish an aggravated assault charge.6 Here,
the deadly weapon used was the defendant’s hands—the hands of a
trained mixed martial arts (MMA) fighter.7
1. MUSASHI MIYAMOTO & STEPHEN F. KAUFMAN, MUSASHI’S BOOK OF FIVE
RINGS: THE DEFINITIVE INTERPRETATION OF MIYAMOTO MUSASHI’S CLASSIC BOOK OF
STRATEGY 33 (2004) (discussing strategy in martial arts and conflict).
2. See Lauren Zakalik, MMA Fighter Sentenced for Using Hands as Deadly Weapons,
WFAA (Nov. 2, 2015, 11:26 PM), http://www.wfaa.com/story/news/local/tarrantcounty/2015/11/02/mma-fighter-sentenced-for-using-hands-as-deadly-weapons/
75073388/ [https://perma.cc/B2K5-H42B] (noting facts surrounding arrest of Jamal Parks).
3. See id.; see also MMA Fighter Jamual Parks Sentenced 6 Years in Prison for Assaulting a Friend, Police Officer with Bare Hands, REALTY TODAY (Nov. 9, 2015, 6:00 AM),
http://www.realtytoday.com/articles/49606/20151109/mma-fighter-jamual-ed
ward-parks-sentenced-6-years-prison-assault.htm [https://perma.cc/NV4Q-JJWQ]
(reporting details that led to Mr. Parks’s arrest and sentencing).
4. See MMA Fighter Jamual Parks Sentenced 6 Years in Prison for Assaulting a
Friend, Police Officer with Bare Hands, supra note 3; see also Zakalik, supra note 2, and
accompanying text.
5. See Zakalik, supra note 2 (noting facts surrounding arrest of Jamal Parks).
6. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(1) (West 2009) (noting statutory criteria for assault with deadly weapon).
7. See Zakalik, supra note 2 (noting facts surrounding arrest of Jamal Parks).
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Although perhaps shocking, this type of charge is not entirely
unprecedented.8 Anyone who has spent time around martial arts
has heard the legend about a black belt or professional boxer registering his or her hands as deadly weapons.9 But, surprisingly, this
idea carries more weight than most anticipated.10 In Mr. Parks’s
case, the defendant plead guilty to aggravated assault.11 Accordingly, there was very little room left for judicial scrutiny of whether
the hands of a martial artist can qualify as a deadly weapon under
the law.12
As is discussed below, a person’s body is generally allowed to be
classified as a deadly weapon under Texas’s case law.13 Although
this direct point has had some glancing blows with the legal system,
there is currently some discrepancy about how to treat the body of
an individual with respect to considering it a deadly weapon.14
States are divided on this issue—some categorically exclude the
body as a deadly weapon, while other states allow the body to be a
deadly weapon under certain circumstances. 15 This Comment will
focus on how, and if, the body of a trained martial artist should be
treated differently under these analyses.16 First, it will discuss various states’ jurisprudence surrounding the issues, showcasing the di8. See Paul Thompson, Judge Rules Martial Arts Fighter’s Hands and Feet are
‘Deadly Weapons’ in Road Rage Attack, DAILY MAIL (last updated Mar. 7, 2012, 12:08
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2111617/Fernando-Rodriguesjailed-Judge-rules-martial-arts-fighters-hands-feet-deadly-weapons.html (discussing
another incident where MMA fighter had his hands charged as deadly weapons in
Florida).
9. See Jonathan Maberry, Martial Arts Myths & Misconceptions Black Belts Having
To Register as Deadly Weapons, FIGHTINGARTS.COM, http://www.fightingarts.com/
reading/article.php?id=460 (last visited Aug. 28, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3J4T9RKR] (discussing legend of black belts having to register as deadly weapons).
10. See Eugene Volokh, ‘These Hands and Feet Are Registered as Deadly Weapons . . .in Guam!’, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/31/these-hands-and-feet-are-registered-asdeadly-weapons-in-guam/ [https://perma.cc/W4N8-T22Z] (noting how martial
arts experts must register their hands and feet as weapons in Guam); see also 10
GUAM CODE ANN. § 62100 (2016) (noting requirement that martial art experts register with government).
11. See Zakalik, supra note 2 (noting facts surrounding arrest of Jamal Parks).
12. See id. (noting case was adjudicated via plea deal).
13. See Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (finding that
hands may constitute deadly weapon if used as such); see also infra notes 21–56 and
accompanying text.
14. Compare Turner, 664 S.W.2d at 89–91 (holding that human body may be
classified as deadly weapon), with People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (N.Y.
1999) (holding that body can never be deadly weapon).
15. Compare Turner, 664 S.W.2d at 89–91, with Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1229; see
also infra notes 21–103 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 120–173 and accompanying text.
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chotomy among state courts in allowing, or not allowing, the
human body to be treated as a deadly weapon.17 Next, this Comment will briefly discuss how deadly various martial arts are, and
one jurisdiction’s approach to the treatment of martial artists under
the law.18 This Comment will then focus on how the body of a martial artist would affect these various paths of analysis.19 Finally, this
Comment will suggest which path of analysis should be utilized in
determining whether the body of a martial artist should be deemed
a deadly weapon, and how that analysis would impact the case of
Mr. Parks.20
II.

BACKGROUND: JUDGE-JITSU—DIFFERENT STATES
DISCIPLINES

WITH

DIFFERENT

A. Round One—Texas Tries to Land the Knockout Blow
Texas has a rather voluminous amount of case law on what
constitutes a deadly weapon and how the use of a person’s body fits
into that analysis.21 The statute that Mr. Parks was charged under
in 2013 is still in effect at the time of writing this article.22 Specifically, Section 22.02 of the Texas Penal Code enumerates when an
assault can be increased to an aggravated assault.23 A standard assault charge can become an aggravated assault if it “causes serious
bodily injury” to another or the perpetrator furnishes a deadly
weapon during the assault.24
17. See infra notes 21– 103 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 104–119 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 122–173 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 174–195 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (determining if hands and fists can be deadly weapons); see also Limuel v. State 568
S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (noting injuries should be taken into account
when determining if object is deadly weapon); Danzig v. State, 546 S.W.2d 299
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (finding evidence insufficiently proved weapon deadly),
overruled on other grounds by Denham v. State, 574 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978); Ohlrich v. State, 287 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956) (finding ordinary
use of hands does not equate to deadly weapon).
22. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (West 2009). Mr. Parks was charged
under Texas Penal Code Section 22.02(b)(2)(B) for his assault on the responding
police officer. See Mixed Martial Artist’s Hands Deemed “Deadly Weapons” in Texas
Assault Case, COMBAT SPORTS LAW (Nov. 3, 2015), http://combatsportslaw.com/
2015/11/03/mixed-martial-artists-hands-deemed-deadly-weapons-in-texas-assaultcase/ [https://perma.cc/NR8L-UJ8L] (referencing copy of indictment imposed
into webpage).
23. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (West 2009).
24. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(1)–(2) (West 2009) (discussing the
charge of aggravated assault).
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In order to determine what can be a deadly weapon, courts
regularly begin their analysis with the statute’s definition section.25
The Texas Penal Code defines a deadly weapon as either “a firearm
or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose
of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or anything that in the
manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury.”26
In 1976, Mosley v. State reached the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas and concerned whether an object could be a deadly
weapon.27 Mosley presents an intuitive starting point of analysis because it was one of the first aggravated assault cases that utilized the
new Penal Code and the legislature’s definition of deadly weapon.28
In Mosley, the defendant approached a female in a parking lot and
threatened to kill her if she did not follow the defendant’s instructions.29 The defendant was armed with an unloaded air rifle, more
commonly referred to as a BB gun.30 The jury in this case determined that the gun used in the crime was very unreliable and
launched projectiles at a very low velocity.31 Applying the statute’s
definition of a deadly weapon, the court determined that this air
rifle was not a deadly weapon for two reasons.32 First, as determined by an expert witness at trial, the rifle was not a firearm and
thus did not fall into the deadly weapon per se category.33 Further,
25. See Mosley v. State, 545 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (noting
Texas’ new Penal Code defines deadly weapon and thus analysis must stem from
that definition); see also Danzig, 546 S.W.2d at 300 (“In determining whether the
evidence was sufficient to show that the knife was a deadly weapon, as alleged, we
turn first to . . . our new Penal Code, which defines ‘deadly weapon’[.]”); Turner,
664 S.W.2d at 89 (noting court’s initial deference to how deadly weapon is defined
in statute).
26. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(17) (West 2011) (defining deadly weapon
pursuant to Texas law).
27. See Mosley, 545 S.W.2d at 145 (noting appellant’s argument that there was
insufficient evidence set forth to show utilization of deadly weapon during crime).
28. See id. at 144. Mosley was decided in 1976, which was three years after the
enactment of the Texas Penal Code currently in use. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 1.01 (West 1994).
29. See Mosley, 545 S.W.2d at 145 (stating facts according to trial court record).
30. See id. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant never threatened
to use the weapon as a bludgeon against the victim, which also weighed into the
court ultimately finding that the air rifle was not a deadly weapon. See id.
31. See Mosley, 545 S.W.2d at 145–46 (detailing why air rifle could not be considered deadly weapon). The air rifle was fired in front of the jury during the trial.
See id. The first attempt to fire the gun failed, and when it was successfully fired
the projectile had a very low velocity. See id. Further, the record noted that projectiles from the gun usually never went over five feet. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. (analyzing why air rifle was not deadly weapon per se). At trial, the
state’s expert witness testified that the air pistol in question was not a firearm. See
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the court found that the air pistol was not used in a manner that
was “calculated to produce death or serious bodily injury.”34 Therefore, because the air rifle as it was used in this case did not fall
under the statutory definitions of deadly weapon, the court vacated
the finding that a deadly weapon was used in the crime.35 The defendant’s case was subsequently reversed and remanded.36
A year later, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals elaborated
on what judges are permitted to consider in determining whether
an object is a deadly weapon.37 In Danzig v. State, the appellant
assaulted a victim with a pen knife—the blade of which was roughly
three or four inches long.38 The main issue was whether this pen
knife was a deadly weapon per se, or if it had to be proven as a
deadly weapon because of how the defendant utilized it.39 By looking to past cases decided using the old penal code, the court determined that “wounds inflicted in the injured party are factors to be
considered in determining whether a weapon is a deadly
weapon.”40 Here, the court determined that the prosecution failed
to show that the wounds inflicted would have resulted in death or
serious injury.41 Thus in this case, the court found that the pen
knife was not a deadly weapon.42
In 1983, the same court decided Turner v. State, one of the first
cases to discuss treating the body as a deadly weapon under the new
id. Therefore, despite the language of Texas Penal Code § 1.07(17)(a), which defines a deadly weapon as a “firearm,” the air rifle in this case did not fall under the
ambit of this provision. See id. at 146.
34. Mosley, 545 S.W.2d at 146 (quoting Brown v. State 233 S.W.2d 578, 579
(Tex. Crim. App. 1950)).
35. See Mosley, 545 S.W.2d at 146.
36. See id.
37. See Danzig v. State, 546 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (reversing
judgment), overruled on other grounds by Denham v. State, 574 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978).
38. See id. at 300.
39. See id. at 300–01.
40. Id. at 301. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered authority
from before the enactment of the 1973 Penal Code, including Williams v. State. See
Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (noting that pocket
knives are not deadly weapons and wounds should be considered when determining deadliness of objects); Johnson v. State, 421 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968) (noting that victim injuries should be considered when evaluating objects’
deadliness); Boazman v. State, 501 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
41. See Danzig, 546 S.W.2d at 302. Although the Danzig court noted the need
for expert testimony to prove that an object was a deadly weapon, this supposition
was later overruled by Denham v. State. See Denham v. State, 574 S.W.2d 129, 131
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (concluding that there is no need for expert testimony to
classify object as deadly weapon).
42. See Danzig, 546 S.W.2d at 302 (finding pen knife did not qualify as deadly
weapon).
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Texas Penal Code.43 In Turner, the appellant was convicted of murder for killing a man with his hands.44 On appeal, the appellant
argued that the trial court erred in finding that his hands were
deadly weapons utilized in the commission of the crime.45 Due to
the flexible definition of “deadly weapon” in Texas’s new penal
code, the court had to determine if the hands of an individual
could be classified as a deadly weapon.46 The court reasoned that
“a fist or hand are not ‘deadly weapons’ per se but can become such
only in the manner used depending on the evidence shown.”47 In
Turner, the prosecution fell short of this evidentiary standard, failing to show that any of the victim’s fatal wounds were caused by the
appellant’s hands.48 Thus, the court seemed to have ushered the
human body into Penal Code Section 1.07(17)(b) by allowing the
body to be a deadly weapon depending on the evidence presented
and the facts surrounding the case.49
Several years later, in Stanul v. State,50 an appellant attempted
to argue that a deadly weapon must be something that is in fact a
weapon, or at the very least an instrument.51 In Stanul, the appellant was charged with murder, and the court found that the appellant utilized a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime as an
aggravating factor.52 Specifically, the prosecution alleged that the
appellant struck the victim’s head against the floor.53 The appellant argued that previous case law required that an alleged deadly
weapon be an instrument or object, and that because the floor was
neither of these, he could not be found to have utilized the floor as
43. See Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 89–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
44. See id. at 86–89 (discussing underlying crime subject to appeal at hand).
45. See id. at 86–87. Additionally, the appellant argued that his due process
rights were violated and that the terms of his plea agreement had been violated,
along with other appeals not relevant to this article. See id.
46. See id. at 89 (“It now has to be determined if a fist and hands are deadly
weapons under the law and the facts of the case.”).
47. Id. at 90 (discussing how body parts can become deadly weapons).
48. See Turner, 664 S.W.2d at 91. Because the finding of a deadly weapon was
not necessary for the appellant’s conviction, the trial court’s decision was affirmed
but the finding of a deadly weapon was vacated. See id.
49. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(17)(b) (West 2011) (defining “deadly
weapon” as “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury”).
50. 870 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
51. See id. at 332–33.
52. See id. at 330 (“He also complains of the jury finding that a deadly weapon
was used in the commission of the offense.”).
53. See id. at 330–32.
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a deadly weapon.54 However, the court disagreed, noting that the
manner in which the floor was utilized in the commission of the
crime—as a hard surface upon which to smash the victim’s head—
was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the floor was a
deadly weapon.55 This case exemplifies Texas judiciary’s position:
anything can be a deadly weapon as long as the prosecution shows
that the object was used in a manner capable of causing serious
harm or death.56
Texas is not the only state that has allowed the human body to
be deemed a deadly weapon.57 For example, in People v. Pennese,58
the Court of Appeals of Colorado determined that “in some circumstances, fists may be considered a deadly weapon.”59 Likewise, in
Hall v. State,60 a Georgia case, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault when no material weapon was utilized in the crime.61
The statute in Hall stated in relevant part: “[a] person commits the
offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a
deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which . . . is
likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury[.]”62 Additionally, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Ohio all allow the fist or other parts of the body to be
considered a deadly weapon or instrument under certain circumstances.63 Further, some states’ judiciaries have opted not to rule
54. See id. at 332–35. The basis for appellant’s argument stems from the wording used in the jury instruction—that the instruction frequently referred to an
“object.” See id. at 332. Appellant argued that the floor could not be referred to as
an “object.” See id. at 332.
55. See id. at 335 (“The jury could rationally find that the floor was capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury in the manner of its use by appellant[.]”).
56. See id.; see also Hill v. State, 913 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)
(finding belts and straps are deadly weapons because they were utilized to deprive
victim of food).
57. See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text (noting other states that
classify body parts as deadly weapons).
58. 830 P.2d 1085 (Colo. App. 1991).
59. Id. at 1087 (rejecting People v. Ross, 819 P.2d 507 (Colo. App. 1991)).
60. 664 S.E.2d 882 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
61. See id. at 885; see also Dasher v. State, 676 S.E.2d 181, 183 (Ga. 2009) (finding hands and feet were deadly weapons), abrogated by Regent v. State, 787 S.E.2d
217 (Ga. 2016).
62. Hall, 664 S.E.2d at 888 (alteration in original) (quoting GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-21(a)(2) (West 2006)).
63. See generally Johnson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Ky. Ct. App.
1996) (“We believe the inclusion of parts of the human body as dangerous instruments depends on the facts of the case and the capability of the body part to ‘cause
death or serious physical injury.’ ”); State v. Born, 159 N.W.2d 283, 284–85 (Minn.
1968) (“In our opinion, fists, when used to strike . . . may or may not be dangerous
weapons depending on the circumstances of the case.”); Puliam v. State, 298 So.2d
711, 713 (Miss. 1974) (“While the use of feet and fists ordinarily would not consti-
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out the possibility that hands can be deadly weapons, even though a
prosecutor has not sought charges classifying the human body as a
deadly weapon or instrument.64
B. Round Two—New York and a Statutory Interpretation Choke
Despite the preceding discussion, a number of states have
elected to disallow the body from ever being considered a deadly
weapon.65 For example, in People v. Owusu, the Court of Appeals of
New York was tasked with deciding whether an individual’s teeth
were a dangerous instrument.66 Owusu stemmed from an altercation where the defendant bit a victim’s finger so severely that he
severed nerves.67 In adjudicating this case, the court first determined that there was a “well-documented legislative history that a
body part was never considered a dangerous weapon or instrument.”68 Next, the court looked to its own jurisprudence, noting
several cases that discussed what objects constituted deadly weapons.69 The court then created a categorical rule prohibiting parts
of the body from being considered a deadly instrument, noting that
a person’s “criminal liability should be measured by the result . . .
not the potential to [cause injury].”70 In reaching this conclusion,
tute the use of a deadly weapon, they can constitute a deadly weapon if used with
means or force likely to produce death.”); State v. Yarrell, 616 S.E.2d 258, 262
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“[H]ands and fists may be considered deadly weapons, given
the manner in which they were used and the relative size and condition of the
parties involved.”) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rogers, 569 S.E.2d 657,
663 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)); State v. Hariott, 42 S.E.2d 385, 389 (S.C. 1947) (refusing to categorically rule out hands as deadly weapons); State v. Griffith, No. CA9510-167, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4539, at *15 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1996).
64. See Hariott, 42 S.E.2d at 389 (“While we are not prepared to say that the fist
may not under some circumstances constitute an instrument which may inflict serious bodily injury, it is not generally regarded as a deadly weapon.”).
65. See infra notes 66–103 and accompanying text.
66. See People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (N.Y. 1999) (deciding if teeth
are considered deadly weapon).
67. See id. Even with the severity of the injuries, the trial court dismissed the
counts that alleged the defendant had utilized a dangerous weapon in his attack.
See id. However, on appeal by the state, the appellate court reinstated the charges.
See id. Specifically, the appellate court relied on People v. Carter, which discussed a
“use-oriented approach” to determining if an object was a deadly weapon. See id. at
1229; People v. Carter, 423 N.E.2d 30, 31–32 (N.Y. 1981). A use-oriented approach allows a deadly weapon to be anything depending on the manner in which
it was used. See Owusu, 423 N.E.2d at 1229–30.
68. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1230 (N.Y. 1999) (noting that “analysis is not premised on placing an exclusion in the statute’s definition”).
69. See id. at 1231–32 (citing People v. Adamkiewicz, 81 N.E.2d 176, 178–181
(N.Y. 1948) (finding that icepick fell under ambit of governing statute as deadly
weapon); People v. Vollmer, 87 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1949) (finding no use of
deadly weapon when defendant beat another man to death with fists)).
70. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1232.
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the court stated that “the hands of a boxer or martial arts expert
could [not] constitute dangerous instruments.”71 The basis for
such a sweeping rule is founded in reasoning that attempted to
avoid an “extraordinary man” rule, which would allow “increased
criminal liability for use of a dangerous instrument where a heavyweight champion merely threatens a blow . . . but not where an
ordinary man beats another to death.”72
New York State further cemented this position in People v.
Plunkett,73 which dealt with a man who also utilized his teeth for an
assault.74 But, unlike in Owusu, there was more possibility for harm,
as the appellant was HIV positive.75 The appellant’s argument relied on the holding in Owusu, relying on the constrictive language
utilized by the court.76 Specifically, the court recognized Owusu’s
attempt to avoid any semblance of a “sliding scale of criminal liability.”77 In doing so, the unanimous panel held “[b]ecause defendant’s saliva too ‘came with him’—indeed, with his teeth—its utility
for penal enhancement may not be treated differently.”78
Likewise, Massachusetts has adopted a broad categorical rule
against the inclusion of the body as a deadly weapon for purposes
of aggravated crimes.79 In Commonwealth v. Davis, the Appeals
Court of Massachusetts concluded that the body can never be a
dangerous weapon.80 However, unlike the New York judiciary, the
Massachusetts court considered a history of prosecution which has
opted to “not consider[ ] assault cases involving the use of hands,
feet, fingers or teeth as incidents where ‘dangerous weapons’ were
employed.”81 Further, the court considered its interest in practic71. Id. at 1231 (stating that martial arts training does not implicate one’s
hands as deadly weapons).
72. Id. (analyzing implications of treating hands as deadly weapons).
73. 971 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 2012).
74. See id. at 364 (discussing classification of body parts as deadly weapons).
75. See id. (noting that appellant was HIV positive and had history of psychiatric illness).
76. See id. at 364–65 (noting that appellant’s attorney premised argument on
language used by court in Owusu).
77. Id. at 368 (quoting People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (N.Y. 1999))
(reasoning appellant’s ability to cause harm versus actual harm would result in
unworkable test and application).
78. Id. (finding saliva of appellant was not deadly weapon).
79. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980)
(“[W]e think that human teeth and other parts of the human body should be
removed from consideration as dangerous weapons in . . . indictments, even on a
case-by-case basis.”).
80. See id. at 420.
81. Id. The court also acknowledged that this suggests that state attorneys
have been unwilling to interpret the court’s precedent in such an expansive way.
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ing “judicial restraint” and keeping with the intent of the legislature
in ruling as they did.82 Specifically, the court noted “[t]he clear
weight of authority is to the effect that bodily parts alone cannot
constitute a dangerous weapon for the purposes of an aggravated
assault.”83 Lastly, a variety of policy considerations were weighed,
looking to both the fairness and deterrent effect of such a rule.84
In Alabama, courts have considered parallel arguments in
reaching a similar conclusion of law.85 In McMillian v. State, the
appellant bit the victim in the face so severely that the victim lost
vision permanently in her left eye.86 Because the appellant and victim were in a relationship at the time of this incident, the appellant
was charged under a domestic violence statute in Alabama.87 Specifically, the statute in question required the use of a “deadly
weapon or a dangerous instrument.”88 In holding for the appellant, the McMillian court adhered very strictly to precedent, which
instructed “that body parts, without more, are not deadly weapons
or dangerous instruments.”89 Even though similar language is utilized by courts reaching similar outcomes as Texas courts, the court
here suggests that “without more” implies some sort of extrinsic object.90 However, this ruling was not reached without disagreement,
See id. Further, the court claimed that other sections of the penal code could be
utilized to enhance punishment based on a sliding scale of potential to cause
harm. See id. at 421–22. This is akin to the rationale used by the New York Court
of Appeals in Owusu. See People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (N.Y. 1999).
82. See Davis, 406 N.E.2d at 421 (suggesting legislative intent should be considered). Further, the court found that such a rule would contradict the legislature in enacting separate statutes for regular and aggravated assault. See id. at
421–22; accord People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 372–73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
83. Davis, 406 N.E.2d at 420.
84. See id. at 420–22. Specifically, the court considered the weight of authority among states on the issue, the possibility of charging such a crime under other
statutes, and the need to avoid statutory “turbulence” where possible. See id. at
422.
85. See McMillian v. State, 58 So.3d 849 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (analyzing
policy considerations).
86. See id. at 850–51 (discussing attack on victim).
87. See id. at 850; see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-130 (2016) (“A person commits
the crime of domestic violence in the first degree if the person commits the crime
of assault in the first degree pursuant to Section 13A-6-20 or aggravated stalking
pursuant to Section 13A-6-91, and the victim is a current or former spouse, parent,
[or] child[.]”).
88. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-20(a) (2016) (noting requirement of deadly weapon
for aggravated assault charge).
89. McMillian, 58 So.3d at 853.
90. Compare id. (noting court’s reliance on higher court’s word choice inferring body parts cannot be deadly weapons “without more”), with Turner v. State,
664 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (noting that body parts can only be
deadly weapons “in the manner used depending on the evidence shown”). Thus,
McMillian and Turner both effectively say that body parts cannot be deadly weapons
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as a number of judges on the panel concurred, but urged the Alabama Supreme Court to overturn its established rule.91
Additionally, in People v. Van Diver, the Court of Appeals of
Michigan made a categorical rule against hands or fists being considered deadly weapons.92 In Van Diver, the defendant used his
hands to cover the mouth of a young girl when he attempted to
abduct her.93 Subsequently, the defendant was charged with felonious assault, which required the use of a deadly weapon.94 The
court overturned the conviction, finding “[i]t is this Court’s belief
that this distinction based on the use of a weapon evidences a legislative intent that bare hands were not to be included as a dangerous
weapon.”95 Further, the Van Diver court noted that “[i]f we were to
rule that bare hands could be a dangerous weapon, it would lead to
anomalous results, for practically every assault that would qualify as
an aggravated assault . . . would also be capable of prosecution as an
assault with a dangerous weapon.”96
Nebraska has also developed a rule which bars classifying the
body as a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.97 In fact, in
State v. Bachelor, where teeth were not considered a deadly weapon,
a Nebraska court considered non-binding authority to conclude
that the body cannot be considered a deadly weapon.98 In Bachelor,
“without more,” but McMillian interprets that as without an additional object, and
Turner interprets that as without additional evidence. See McMillian, 58 So.3d at
853; Turner, 664 S.W.2d at 90.
91. See McMillian, 58 So.3d at 853–54 (Wise, J., concurring) (“Therefore, I
write specially to urge the Alabama Supreme Court to reconsider its holding in Ex
Parte Cobb that the use of body parts cannot constitute the use of a ‘deadly weapon’
or a ‘dangerous instrument.’ ”) (urging reconsideration of Ex Parte Cobb, 703 So.2d
871 (Ala. 1996)).
92. See People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
93. See id. at 371.
94. See id. The governing statute in this case was Michigan Compiled Laws
Section 750.82, which listed a variety of deadly weapons, and then states “or other
dangerous weapon” as a catch-all for finding a deadly weapon. See id. at 371; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.82 (West 2016).
95. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d at 372. Thus, the court also looked to the legislative intent of the statute and practiced judicial restraint, as seen in many other
cases discussed. See supra notes 66–94 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
98–103 and accompanying text.
96. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d at 373. The Court of Appeals of Nebraska later
relied on the Van Diver court’s reasoning in deciding State v. Bachelor. See State v.
Bachelor, 575 N.W.2d 625, 629–30 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning that allowing
hands to be deadly weapons would allow all assaults to be assault with deadly
weapon).
97. See Bachelor, 575 N.W.2d at 631.
98. See id. at 631. As this was a case of first impression for Nebraska, the court
opted to consider authority from other jurisdictions as guidance. See generally id.
(noting that weight of persuasive authority favors disallowing body parts from be-
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the defendant took a bite out of another person’s nose with his
teeth and was subsequently charged with assault in the second degree, which required the use of a deadly weapon. 99 The court
ruled that hands, feet, and teeth cannot amount to a deadly
weapon because of the potential policy implications that stem from
it.100 Specifically, the majority wrote, “[i]f we rule that teeth or
other body parts are dangerous instruments, then virtually every assault which would qualify as a third degree assault would also be
capable of prosecution as second degree assault.”101 Essentially, the
court was wary of overstepping the bounds set by the legislature,
and they felt that allowing the body to be classified as a deadly
weapon would blur the line between assault with an extrinsic
weapon and assault with the bare hands, feet, or teeth.102 Other
judiciaries throughout the country have also cited these policy
concerns.103
C. Taking the Gloves Off —How Should Martial Arts Training
Impact the Treatment of the Body as a Deadly
Weapon?
There are very different ways to analyze and consider the deadliness a person’s body.104 However, all of the previously discussed
cases had one thing in common—they all dealt with suspects who
ing classified as deadly weapons); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417,
420 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (reasoning that the majority of states do not allow body
parts to be deemed deadly weapons).
99. See Bachelor, 575 N.W.2d at 627. The statute that the defendant was
charged under was Revised Statutes of Nebraska Section 28-309 (1)(a), which
stated that “[a] person commits second degree assault if he or she intentionally or
knowingly causes bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument[.]”
Id. at 629.
100. See id. at 631–32 (discussing reasoning for finding that body parts cannot
be deadly weapons).
101. Id. at 631 (identifying problems with treating body parts as deadly
weapons).
102. See id. at 631–32 (“Without excluding body parts from the definition of
dangerous instruments, the shove in the bar is no different from a slash with a
knife or a gunshot unless there is serious bodily injury[.]”). The court elaborated,
saying that if serious bodily injury resulted, then a different statute could be utilized to charge the suspect, specifically Revised Statutes of Nebraska Section 28109(20). See id. (discussing why body parts should not be classified as deadly
weapons).
103. See People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (“If
we were to rule that bare hands could be a dangerous weapon, it would lead to
anomalous results, for practically every assault that would qualify as an aggravated
assault . . . would be capable of prosecution as an assault with a dangerous
weapon.”) The court further explained that such a result was not intended by the
legislature by the fact that the two offenses are actually separate offenses. See id.
104. See supra notes 21–103 and accompanying text.
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used their body to strike someone, but that suspect did not have a
history of martial arts training.105 Thus, the judicial system is left
with a grey area of how to handle a trained martial artist in a similar
situation.106 As noted previously, New York State did away with this
concern in one sentence, although other courts have not been
quite as dismissive.107
Intuitively, all martial arts are not equally dangerous to life and
limb.108 However, some styles are in fact deadly.109 Courts have yet
to fully embrace exactly how to treat martial arts in the eyes of the
law, even though there have been some instances where the two
have intersected.110 For example, the occasion that gives rise to the
writing of this article, where Jamal Parks was charged with assault
with a deadly weapon, showcases the variety of legal frameworks
courts have opted to utilize.111 Further, in 2012 another trained
martial artist was charged with assault with a deadly weapon when
he struck two men with his hands during a road rage incident.112
105. For a discussion of instances of assault with no martial arts training, see
supra notes 21–103 and accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of instances of assault with no martial arts training, see
supra notes 21–103 and accompanying text.
107. See People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (N.Y. 1999) (“Nor can an
argument be made that . . . the hands of a boxer or martial arts expert could
constitute dangerous instruments[.]”).
108. See Why Most Martial Arts Don’t Work, FUNCTIONAL SELF DEFENSE, http://
www.functionalselfdefense.org/martial-arts-dont-work [https://perma.cc/7D57XYLE] (discussing problems with most types of martial arts for purposes of realworld application).
109. See Teenager Chokes His Cousin to Death Using RNC, GRACIE JIU-JITSU ACADEMY (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.gracieacademy.com/news/teenager-chokes-hiscousin-to-death-using-rnc.asp [https://perma.cc/3A5G-SK5N] (discussing death
of twenty-four-year-old who died after being choked by fourteen-year-old trained in
Brazilian Jiu Jitsu); see also Bonnie Malkin, British Kick-Boxing Champion Dies in Sydney Fight, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 17, 2011, 11:42 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/8706238/British-kick-boxingchampion-dies-in-Sydney-fight.html (discussing in-ring collapse and subsequent
death of Muay Thai Kickboxing fighter); Eben Pindyck, An Obsessive Chronicle of
Deaths in the Ring, NEW YORKER (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/
sporting-scene/an-obsessive-chronicle-of-deaths-in-the-ring [https://perma.cc/
Q5H4-BP8C] (chronicling deaths of boxers while in ring).
110. See Thompson, supra note 8 (discussing incident where hands and feet
were deemed deadly weapons in road rage incident involving MMA fighter); see
also infra notes 112–113 and accompanying text (discussing road rage incident
with trained martial artist).
111. See supra notes 2–14 and accompanying text.
112. See Thompson, supra note 8. In this case of MMA expert Fernando Rodrigues, Judge John Hurley stated:
I’ve always thought that if you are a black belt in karate or you are an
expert in martial arts, that your hands and feet would be considered
weapons. That’s what I’ve always thought since I was an attorney. He’s a
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However, this man was subsequently found not guilty in a later jury
trial.113
Nonetheless, a lesser-known jurisdiction rose to the challenge,
and actually codified how martial arts training should be considered in assault cases.114 In Guam, a series of statutes requires that
experts of karate, judo, or other martial arts register with the Department of Revenue and Taxation.115 The statute defines expert
as
[A] person trained in the arts of . . . fighting technique,
whereby the hands . . . or other parts of the body are used
as weapons, who shall have completed at least one level of
training therein and have been issued a belt or other symbol showing proficiency in such art.116
Further, failure to register as required can result in a misdemeanor charge.117 However, if the accused is charged with some
type of physical assault after registration, the registered expert
“shall upon conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of aggravated assault.”118 Thus, Guam avoided any semblance of judicial scrutiny of
the issue central to this article, as the legislature has stepped in and
made an assault by a martial artist an automatic aggravated
assault.119
mixed martial arts competitor. He’s an expert in Muay Thai and Brazilian Jujitsu.
Id. (quoting Judge John Hurley).
113. See Former MMA Fighter Cleared in Coral Springs Road Rage Incident, NBC
MIAMI (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/Former-MMA-FighterCleared-in-Coral-Springs-Road-Rage-Incident-229236841.html [https://perma.cc/
4TW9-UW8B] (noting defendant was found not guilty by jury trial). According to
the report, the jury seemed to believe that the defendant utilized his martial arts
training to “de-escalate the situation.” See id.
114. See Volokh, supra note 10 (discussing how martial arts experts must register their hands and feet as weapons in Guam); see also 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62100
(2016).
115. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62100–62106 (2016). The registration of an
individual who is a qualified expert costs a one-time fee of $5.00. See id. § 62103
(2016).
116. 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62104 (2016) (defining karate or judo expert
generally).
117. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62105 (2016) (listing penalties for failure to
register).
118. 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62106 (2016) (describing charges for assault
when one is a martial arts expert).
119. See id.; see also Volokh, supra note 10; Are Your Hands and Feet “Registered as
Deadly Weapons?” WEAPONSMAN (Mar. 31, 2014), http://weaponsman.com/?p=14
769 [https://perma.cc/2J2Y-BDVX] (noting automatic increase to aggravated
assault).
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III. ANALYSIS: DEVELOPING A GAME PLAN: DETERMINING WHAT
APPROACH COURTS SHOULD UTILIZE WHEN EVALUATING
THE STATUS OF A MARTIAL ARTISTS’ BODY AS A
DEADLY WEAPON
Given both paths of analysis for determining if hands can be
deadly weapons in addition to the position Guam has taken, courts
are left with three very different ways to analyze the same problem—especially when martial artists are thrown into the mix.120
Thus, the remainder of this Comment will focus on the pros and
cons of the three separate paths of analysis present—the “per se
rule” holding that the body can never be a deadly weapon; the analysis that, if proven, the body can be a deadly weapon; and the Guam
approach, which codifies the treatment of martial artists’ hands and
feet.121
A. The Ground Game: New York’s Treatment of Martial Artists’
Hands as Deadly Weapons
States like New York have created a “per se rule” disallowing
the body from ever being considered a deadly weapon.122 Most
would agree that this approach utilizes the highest amount of judicial restraint because this analysis appreciates the existence of separate statutes for aggravated and regular assault.123 As discussed by a
number of the courts above, many states have separate statutes for
120. For background information and analysis of courts finding the body can
never be a deadly weapon, see supra notes 65–103 and accompanying text. For
background and analysis of court’s finding the body can be considered a deadly
weapon, see supra notes 21–64 and accompanying text. For more on Guam’s law
requiring the registration of martial arts experts, see supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text.
121. For a strength and weakness analysis of courts who have found that the
body can never be a deadly weapon, see infra notes 122–138 and accompanying
text. For a strength and weakness analysis of courts finding that the body can be a
deadly weapon, see infra notes 139–158 and accompanying text. For an analysis
discussing the strengths and weaknesses of Guam’s approach to martial artists’
bodies being considered deadly weapons, see infra notes 159–173 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 65–103 and accompanying text (discussing law New York
and other states have adopted).
123. For a discussion on various state laws, see supra notes 65–103 and accompanying text. See also People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228, 1232–33 (N.Y. 1999) (noting that there are separate statutes for crimes with deadly weapons because the
body should not be defined as deadly weapon); People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d
370, 372 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (“It is this Court’s belief that this distinction based
on the use of a weapon evidences a legislative intent that bare hands were not to be
included as a dangerous weapon.”).
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assault and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.124 Thus, if an
assault with hands or feet can fall under either statute, then virtually
every assault that uses the hands or feet could be charged as an
aggravated assault.125 However, if the legislature was seeking this
outcome, then the separate statutes could depend solely on the
harm caused and not necessarily the use of a deadly weapon.126
Relatedly, the New York judiciary confronts the martial artist’s
hands dilemma directly in their pursuit to avoid an “extraordinary
man rule.”127 Again, allowing the hands of a trained martial artists
to be a deadly weapon blurs the statutory lines set by the legislature.128 For example, a slight jab to the face by a boxer could be
aggravated assault, whereas an ordinary man beating another man
to within inches of his death would only be regular assault.129
However, the logic in opposition to the extraordinary man rule
still accounts for a situation where a heavyweight boxer and a normal person both deliver one punch to a victim.130 Here, the boxer
would be more likely to cause a more severe injury than an ordinary
person.131 And still, this works out to impose a higher penalty on
the boxer than on the ordinary man, but not because of his capability of causing a more severe injury; rather, it is because he actually
did cause a more severe injury.132 Thus, the New York model fo124. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting states that have
adopted separate aggravated and regular assault statutes).
125. See People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (“It
is our belief that the [l]egislature . . . intended that the statutes should be distinct
and separate.”).
126. See Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (noting
that “wounds inflicted on the injured party are factors to be considered in determining whether a weapon is a deadly weapon”) (quoting Danzig v. State, 546
S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Denham v.
State, 574 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).
127. See People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (N.Y. 1999) (“Nor can the
argument be made that . . . the hands of a boxer or martial arts expert could
constitute dangerous instruments.”).
128. See id. at 1231–32 (noting that separate statutes exist to treat hands separate from weapons).
129. See id. at 1231 (noting problems with measuring culpability by potential
to harm).
130. See id. (noting unfairness toward boxer when compared to ordinary man
beating someone to death with their hands).
131. See Cecil Adams, The True Force of a Boxer’s Punch, CONNECT SAVANNAH
(July 20, 2010), http://www.connectsavannah.com/savannah/the-true-force-of-aboxers-punch/Content?oid=2133328 [https://perma.cc/8CTK-67GA] (discussing
punching power of seven Olympic boxers, which ranges from 447 to 1,066 pounds
of peak punching force at the point of impact).
132. See Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1232 (noting that one’s ability to cause harm
“should not expose him to criminal liability beyond that measured by the extent of
his victim’s injury”).
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cuses on the end result of the injury, not on the perpetrator’s ability
to inflict harm.133 Under this analysis, courts treat martial artists
the same as an ordinary person—increase the penalties only if the
harm is increased, not if the harm could have been increased.134
However, such an approach avoids any semblance of deterrent
principles because martial artists are not ‘put on notice’ that they
could face higher criminal penalties—regardless of if those higher
penalties are from an ability to inflict harm or from the actual harm
caused.135 Other courts have also implied that hands should not be
a deadly weapon because there is a lack of notice for the perpetrator that their body could be a deadly weapon.136 For example, the
Appeals Court of Massachusetts noted the historical lack of prosecuting the body as a deadly weapon as a reason for creating a per se
rule against the body being a deadly weapon.137 Thus, the Massachusetts judiciary also considers fairness to the defendant, and assumes that people would act differently with their hands if they
were on notice that their hands could be a deadly weapon.138
B. Stand and Throw ‘em: Texas’s Approach to Martial Artists’
Hands as Deadly Weapons
On the opposite end of the spectrum are states like Texas
which have left the door open for finding that the body is a deadly
weapon.139 Under this approach, the body can be categorized as a
deadly weapon “in the manner used depending on the evidence
shown.”140 Even though this is the opposite approach than the pre133. See id.; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(1) (McKinney 2016) (reasoning
actually causing serious physical injury to victim is an element of assault in the
second degree).
134. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(1) (McKinney 2016); see also Owusu, 712
N.E.2d at 1232 (“If a person is capable of producing serious physical injury and
does so, his criminal liability should be measured by the result (the injury), not the
potential to do so.”).
135. See JOHN P. HOFFMAN, DELINQUENCY THEORIES 17–32 (1st ed. 2011) (discussing principles of deterrence).
136. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980)
(“[F]or over fifty years prosecutors have not considered assault cases involving the
use of hands, feet, fingers or teeth as incidents where dangerous weapons were
employed.”); see also Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass.
1980) (discussing use of deterrence in aggravating statutes).
137. See Davis, 406 N.E.2d at 420 (noting prosecutors’ choice to not charge
assaults with the body as assaults with a deadly weapon).
138. See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 21–64 and accompanying text.
140. Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (“[W]e conclude that a fist or hand are not ‘deadly weapons’ per se but can become such only
in the manner used depending on the evidence shown.”). For additional discus-
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viously discussed courts have taken, similar factors are considered.141 For example, whereas New York looks to the harm caused
in determining what crime to charge the defendant with, Texas
considers the harm caused to the victim in deciding if an object is a
deadly weapon.142 However, this approach can have serious
problems with consistency.143 For example, depending on how an
item is used it may be classified as a deadly weapon.144 Thus, Texas
also avoids any semblance of a deterrent effect because an object
may be a deadly weapon in one sense, whereas the identical object
is not a deadly weapon in another.145
Additionally, courts subscribing to this method must weigh the
sufficiency of evidence in determining whether hands or feet are a
deadly weapon.146 Thus, this approach removes the determination
of whether the body is a deadly weapon from the legislature and
places it in the courtroom.147 However, when martial artists are implicated, this seems to make more sense.148 As discussed above, a
trained martial artist is more capable of delivering severe harm to a
person.149 Just as a three-inch pen knife may not be a deadly
weapon, but an eight-inch buck knife would be, the ability of an
sion about Texas’ approach to the body and deadly weapons, see supra notes 21–64
and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 142–158 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ reliance on harm for defining what is deadly weapon versus what is aggravated
assault).
142. See Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (noting
that wounds inflicted should be considered in determining if weapons are deadly).
143. See infra notes 144–145 and accompanying text.
144. See Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 88–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (noting
that because prosecution must prove a weapon is deadly by how it is used in a
crime, this will inherently mean that same object will be deadly in some instances
and not deadly in others).
145. See id. For additional discussion on deterrence, see HOFFMAN, supra note
135, at 17–32.
146. See Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (analyzing
whether “the evidence presented at appellant’s trial was legally sufficient to prove
that, during the commission of his offense, he used his hand or his foot as a deadly
weapon.”). In Lane, the court reasoned that the use of the defendant’s closed fist
to strike the victim several times in the head and the repeated kicking of the victim
in the body was sufficient evidence to show his body was used as a deadly weapon.
See id.
147. Compare Turner, 664 S.W.2d at 88–91 (discussing what courts should consider in deciding if something is a deadly weapon), with Commonwealth v. Davis,
406 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (showing great deference to legislature’s interpretation of deadly weapon).
148. See infra notes 149–152 and accompanying text (discussing martial artists’ impact on Texas’s approach).
149. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing damage capable by
martial artists).
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object to cause harm is an intuitive consideration in determining if
a weapon is deadly.150 In the same way, the Texas judiciary takes a
similar approach to the body—hands and feet should be treated
differently depending on their ability to cause harm, just as any
other object would be.151 Thus, the logical conclusion is that the
body can be a deadly weapon if it is proven to be utilized in a deadly
way.152
However, there is one glaring drawback to this approach,
which courts aligning with New York have cited.153 By allowing the
body to be a deadly weapon, it effectively allows any assault to be
tried as an assault with a deadly weapon.154 Texas would most likely
counter this argument by claiming that their evidence-based approach is a protection to the legislature’s statutory scheme—if
there is no evidence to show that the body was used as a deadly
weapon, then it cannot be charged as a deadly weapon.155 Further,
Texas courts could argue that they are well within the ambit of their
law and are not practicing judicial activism, because the Texas Penal Code defines a deadly weapon as “anything that in the manner
of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury.”156 Because the Penal Code uses the word “anything”
instead of the words “object or instrument,” Texas is not overstepping the language used by the legislature in their Penal Code.157
Thus, there is no basis for criticizing the Texas judiciary on the
150. See Turner, 664 S.W.2d at 88–90 (discussing need to weigh wounds caused
by object in determining status as deadly).
151. See id. at 90 (citing lack of evidence for not finding hands and feet were
not deadly weapons).
152. See id. (noting why body parts can be treated as deadly weapons).
153. See infra notes 154–158 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
problems allowing body parts to be deadly weapon creates).
154. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417, 421–22 (Mass. App. Ct.
1980) (discussing how treating the body as deadly weapon would obstruct the statutory scheme); see also People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Mich. Ct. App.
1977) (noting that if hands were deadly weapons then every assault could be assault with use of deadly weapon).
155. See Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 88–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (discussing need to consider harm caused against victim).
156. TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(17)(B) (West 2011).
157. Compare id. (noting utilization of “anything” as word choice), with N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 10.00(13) (McKinney 2013) (defining “dangerous instrument” as
“any instrument, article, or substance, including a ‘vehicle’[,] . . . under the circumstances in which it is used, . . . is readily capable of causing death or other
serious physical injury.). Specifically, the New York law utilized language which
suggests the use of an extrinsic object, whereas the language used by the Texas
legislature does not. See id. Further, the definition of “dangerous instrument” was
utilized instead of the definition of “deadly weapon” because “deadly weapon” is
defined by a short list of specific weapons in the New York Penal Code. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 10.00(12) (McKinney 2013) (defining “deadly weapon”).
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grounds that they are being too judicially active, as they are interpreting the law well within the language used by the legislature.158
C. Fighting in the Clinch: Guam’s Approach to Martial Artists’
Hands as Deadly Weapons
Guam’s answer to this predicament is novel.159 In an attempt
to avoid any judicial scrutiny of the issue, Guam codified the requirement for martial arts experts to register themselves with the
government.160 This approach most closely aligns with the principles of deterrence because it puts individuals on notice that they
will be held to a higher standard if they are involved in a physical
altercation.161 Considering the amount of harm some martial artists can do, this seems to make the most logical sense.162 Further,
this approach avoids the sliding scale of liability that the New York
judiciary was wary of because it does not allow for a panoply of factors to be considered when evaluating what specific statute under
which an individual should be charged.163 In that regard, the issue
is clear: a martial arts expert using his or her body in an assault will
158. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting why Texas’s courts are
compliant with the legislature in their utilization of law).
159. See supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text (discussing Guam’s approach to dealing with body parts as deadly weapons when martial artists are
involved).
160. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62100 (2016) (discussing requirement of registration for martial arts experts).
161. See HOFFMAN, supra note 135, at 17–32. Specifically, the text discusses the
need for a rational person who can make choices by weighing the pros and cons of
a particular decision. See id. at 18. Additionally, for effective deterrence, the swiftness in the administration of justice, certainty of being caught, and severity of punishment must outweigh the potential gain from committing the crime. See id. at
20–21. Thus, putting an individual on notice of a more severe penalty serves one
of these principles. See id. at 20–22. Additionally, legally mandated registration
could add credence to the certainty of being caught for a crime, because it forces
additional contact between the individual and the governing authority. See id. at
25–26.
162. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing harm martial artists are capable of).
163. See People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (N.Y. 1999). Specifically, the
court noted that if hands could be considered deadly weapons, then courts would
need to consider “the size of the perpetrator, his weight, strength, etc., as well as
any infirmities or frailties of the victim would all be relevant in understanding
one’s ability to cause serious physical injury or death.” Id. By avoiding consideration of these other factors, Guam exemplifies a better understanding of the deadliness of martial arts, as some martial arts are deadly regardless of the size and
weight of parties involved in the altercation. See Dan Faggella, Five Keys for Becoming
a Jiu-Jitsu Giant Killer, JIU-JITSU MAG. (May 12, 2015), http://jiujitsumag.com/fivekeys-for-becoming-a-jiu-jitsu-giant-killer/ [https://perma.cc/NJQ3-EE9W] (noting
that Jiu Jitsu “was created for a smaller, weaker practitioner to defeat bigger,
stronger opponents”).
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be charged as an aggravated assault.164 Compared to the convoluted analysis that the Texas approach and New York approach can
breed, the clarity in Guam’s treatment of the issue is rather
refreshing.165
Additionally, this approach avoids some courts’ concerns that
allowing the body to be a deadly weapon would cause separate statutes to begin to share a very blurry line.166 Specifically, there is a
very valid concern that allowing the body to be classified as a deadly
weapon would create an automatic aggravating factor in virtually all
assault cases at the discretion of the prosecution.167 However,
under Guam’s approach to this issue, only martial artists could have
their assault charge aggravated, thus avoiding this potential
arbitrariness.168
However, one could argue that this simply shuffles the analysis
instead of doing away with the issue altogether.169 For example,
courts will still need to determine at what point an individual has
trained in a martial art long enough to warrant the requirement of
registration.170 The statute suggests that the litmus test is when
164. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62106 (2016) (“Any registered karate or judo
expert who thereafter is charged with having used his art in a physical assault on
some other person, shall upon conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of aggravated
assault.”).
165. See supra notes 65–103 and accompanying text for more on how the New
York courts have handled this issue. See supra notes 21–64 and accompanying text
for more on how the Texas courts have handled this issue.
166. See People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that allowing bare hands to be charged as deadly weapons “would lead to
anomalous results, for practically every assault that would qualify as an aggravated
assault . . . would also be capable of prosecution as an assault with a dangerous
weapon”); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417, 421–22 (Mass. App. Ct.
1980) (discussing problems with allowing bare hands to be classified as deadly
weapons); State v. Bachelor, 575 N.W.2d 625, 631–32 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (noting
that without excluding body parts from being deadly weapons, shoving someone
could be charged under same statute as shooting someone).
167. See Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d at 373; see also Davis, 406 N.E.2d at 420 (noting
no history of prosecutors charging bare handed assaults as assaults with deadly
weapons).
168. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 62100–62106 (2016) (discussing the treatment of martial artists in assault charges).
169. See infra notes 170–173 and accompanying text (stating problems
presented by Guam’s approach).
170. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62104 (2016) (noting that a martial artist is
required to register when they “have completed at least one level of training” and
“have been issued a belt or other symbol showing proficiency in such art”). Although this section defines when someone may be required to register, different
martial arts issue belts at different stages. See Jennifer Lawler, Martial Arts Promotions . . . Testing, 1, 2, 3, DUMMIES, http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/
martial-arts-promotions-testing-1-2-3.html [https://perma.cc/6E4L-4XX8] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (observing variety of ways different martial arts administer rank
increase tests).
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someone “[has] been issued a belt or other symbol showing proficiency in such art.”171 Thus, this presents a problem based on the
lethality among various martial arts and the levels of proficiency attained by the practitioner.172 Although this codification avoids judicial consideration in determining if the body of a martial artist is
a deadly weapon, it creates room for additional scrutiny in determining when an individual has “shown proficiency” in a given martial art.173
IV.

CONCLUSION: WHY GUAM HAS THE BLUEPRINT
THE RIGHT SYSTEM

FOR

As mixed martial arts continues to grow and more people begin practicing martial arts, courts will probably see more cases relating to martial artists and if their bodies are considered deadly
weapons.174 Currently, the weight of authority favors disallowing
the hands from being considered deadly weapons, but courts
reached this conclusion with little attention paid to how martial artists fit into that analysis.175 With the potential deadliness of martial
artists considered, it seems that Guam’s approach of registration
makes the most sense for two main reasons.176
First, martial arts practitioners now have notice that they will
be held to a higher standard in an assault case.177 Primarily, this
fulfills one of the key requirements of deterrence because it puts
171. 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62104 (2016) (noting when someone must register with the government).
172. See supra note 109 and accompanying text for a discussion about the potential lethality of various martial arts.
173. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62104 (2016); see also supra notes 169–172 and
accompanying text.
174. See Kevin Iole, Why MMA is Bigger than Ever – And Still Growing, YAHOO!
SPORTS (July 24, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/why-mma-is-bigger-then-ever-and-still-growing-195031479.html [https://perma.cc/U64B-NFCX]
(noting growth of Mixed Martial Arts); see also Alan Snel, Small Businesses Bloom as
Mixed Martial Arts Grow in Popularity, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS (last updated September 9, 2013, 7:12 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/business-press/
small-businesses-bloom-mixed-martial-arts-grow-popularity [https://perma.cc/
2HHD-2AP7] (discussing growth of small businesses in martial arts industry).
175. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980)
(“The clear weight of authority is to the effect that bodily parts alone cannot constitute a dangerous weapon for the purpose of an aggravated assault based on the
alleged use of such a weapon.”).
176. See infra notes 177–184 and accompanying text (analyzing why Guam’s
approach makes sense).
177. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62100 (2016). By requiring registration, martial art practitioners are effectively put on notice of their potentially heightened
criminal liability. See generally id.
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the individuals on notice of their potentially higher legal liability.178
Further, this incentivizes safe practices in not only teaching the art,
but also the responsibility accompanied with it.179
Second, this approach avoids the possibility of the common
person having their hands deemed a deadly weapon and, in turn,
avoids the statutory ambiguity cited as a concern by many courts.180
An approach modeled off of Guam’s statutes would only allow increased liability for martial artists who have reached a certain level
of proficiency.181 Thus, judicial scrutiny would be avoided in determining if a layperson’s hands are deadly weapons.182 Additionally,
this would not blur the lines between different levels of assault, because only martial artists would be subject to increased liability.183
Thus, this approach would avoid the problem cited in many courts,
which suggest that allowing the body to be a deadly weapon would
make virtually every assault capable of being an aggravated
assault.184
The biggest hurdle inherent in the Guam approach is how
courts should determine the proficiency level that is required for a
martial artist’s hands to be deemed deadly weapons.185 But, like a
large number of specialized issues in courts, determining the deadliness of a martial artist’s hands would be analyzed better in light of
expert testimony on the issue.186 As is commonplace in today’s le178. See HOFFMAN, supra note 135, at 17–32. Specifically, this adds weight to
the severity and the certainty of punishment, which are both touchstones to successful deterrence. See id. at 20–21. For more discussion on the principles of deterrence, see supra note 167 and accompanying text.
179. See HOFFMAN, supra note 135, at 17–32; see also supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence generally).
180. See People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (observing that allowing bare hands to be deadly weapons would cause problems with
current statutory scheme); see also supra note 172 and accompanying text.
181. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 62100–62106 (2016) (discussing Guam’s approach to martial artists being treated as deadly weapons).
182. See id. (discussing Guam’s avoidance of classifying regular hands as
deadly weapons).
183. See id. (discussing increased penalties for martial artists in assault cases).
184. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417, 421–22 (Mass. App. Ct.
1980) (discussing how allowing human body to be considered deadly weapon
would allow virtually any assault to be assault with deadly weapon); see also People v.
Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that if hands were
deadly weapons, then every assault could be assault utilizing deadly weapon); State
v. Bachelor, 575 N.W.2d 625, 631–32 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that without
excluding body parts from being deadly weapons, shoving someone could be
charged under same statute as shooting someone).
185. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62104 (2016) (defining karate or judo expert
for purposes of the statute); see also supra notes 169–173 and accompanying text.
186. See Mosley v. State, 545 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (noting
use of expert testimony in determining if object is deadly weapon); see also Turner
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gal world, lawyers and judges frequently lack specialized knowledge
that requires the use of expert testimony.187 Similarly, judges could
rely on expert testimony to determine if an individual is proficient
enough in a martial art to warrant the title of expert.188 Thus, the
admittance of expert testimony would properly illuminate this issue, and allow the court to reach a supported conclusion of law.189
Even if the Guam approach was applied in the case of Mr.
Parks, the outcome would probably be the same.190 Mr. Parks was a
professional mixed martial arts fighter.191 Under the scrutiny of
any expert’s testimony, he would most likely be found to be proficient enough at his art to warrant his hands being treated as a
deadly weapon.192 The key difference, however, is that he would be
aware of his potential liability, and possibly would have been dev. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (noting that there was lack of
evidence and testimony to support finding hands were deadly weapons). Although
Texas courts used to require expert testimony to establish that an object is a deadly
weapon, this was later overruled by Denham v. State. See Denham v. State, 574
S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The Denham court reasoned that “[t]o
say that a four-inch bladed knife, whether it is a pocket knife or some other type, is
not a deadly weapon unless an expert so testifies is to strain the bounds of reason.”
See id. at 131 (quoting Harris v. State, 562 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)). Although expert testimony is not required to prove that
an object is a deadly weapon, expert testimony can still be helpful to determine if
an object is a deadly weapon. See Tamez v. State, 205 S.W.3d 32, 39–40, 43–44
(Tex. Ct. App. 2006). In Tamez, expert testimony was utilized to show that a fan
motor placed in a sock was a deadly weapon. See id. Thus, although expert testimony is not required to prove an object is a deadly weapon, it can be a helpful way
to prove an object’s status as a deadly weapon. See id.; see also Davidson v. State, 602
S.W.2d 272, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“Although such expert testimony is not
the only way to establish that a knife is a deadly weapon, it may still be particularly
useful in supplementing meager evidence on the issue in order to meet the sufficiency requirement.”)
187. See Greg Eastman, Vandy M. Howell & Maria Salgado, A Primer on When to
Use Expert Witnesses and How to Find Them, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 7, 2013), http://
www.bna.com/a-primer-on-when-to-use-expert-witnesses-and-how-to-find-them/
[https://perma.cc/U6F4-FBTE] (noting when to use expert testimony in
litigation).
188. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also Eastman et al., supra
note 187.
189. See supra notes 186–188 and accompanying text (discussing why expert
testimony would be appropriate).
190. See infra notes 191–195 and accompanying text (observing why Guam’s
approach would analyze the case of Jamal Parks similarly).
191. See Jamal Parks, SHERDOG, http://www.sherdog.com/fighter/Jamal-Parks134229 (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing Jamal Parks’ professional mixed martial arts career and record); see also Jamal Parks, T A P O L O G Y , http://
www.tapology.com/fightcenter/fighters/52542-jamal-parks [https://perma.cc/
4S9M-5Y9G] (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (noting Jamal Park’s professional martial
arts career).
192. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the dangerousness
of various martial art styles).
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terred from making the choice to assault someone.193 Had Mr.
Parks been forced to register his hands as deadly weapons, he
would have known the potential consequences of his actions that
day in November 2013.194 Although nobody can say for certain
whether that registration process would have caused Jamal Parks to
act differently, at the very least it would not have surprised him or
the martial arts world when a court ruled his hands were deadly
weapons.195
Michael R. Romeo*
193. HOFFMAN, supra note 135, at 17–32. This conclusion relies on the effectiveness of deterrence theory, and that Mr. Parks would have been aware of swift,
certain, and severe punishment if he chose to assault someone. See id. at 18–20.
194. See 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 62100 (2016) (noting the requirement to register). Mr. Parks would be aware of the increased liability in his hands because he
would have to register them with the government. See generally id.
195. See generally id. (noting requirement to register which assumes notice).
* Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law J.D. Candidate, May
2017.
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